Chapter 1: Political Succession: Changing Guards and Changing Rules
Joseph Fewsmith

Although the central question that is to be dealt with in this chapter is the impact of political succession, that factor is clearly embedded in other factors, many of which have been operating throughout the reform period. Thus, it will be helpful to begin by enumerating, but not exhaustively discussing, the trends that appear to have pushed the Chinese system in the direction of institutionalization.

First, in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, there was a very strong desire on the part of party elites to restore party norms. It can be objected that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) violated whatever norms it had tried to establish throughout its history, but many party veterans shared a belief that there was a core of norms governing personal behavior, party procedures, and partysociety relations. There was a renewed stress in the early reform period on the CCP as an organization governed by procedures in which the exercise of authority would not be so arbitrary. This was reflected in the party's adoption of the "Guiding Principles for Political Life Within the Party" in 1980. Clearly, there was a tension between personal authority, which concentrated power in the hands of party secretaries at various levels, and organizational procedures, which called for party committees to discuss policy collectively. This tension has by no means disappeared, though party procedures appear to be somewhat more consultative these days.

Second, there was a discussion opened on the relationship between the party and the legal system. The 1982 constitution called for "all political parties" to "take the constitution as the basic norm of conduct." This declaration, even if honored mostly in the breach, nevertheless marked a conscious break with Mao's defiant assertion that he was "a monk holding an umbrella," unrestrained by law or heaven. The Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002 strengthened this admonition, saying, "We must operate strictly in accordance with the law. No organizations or individuals are allowed to have the privilege of overstepping the Constitution and other laws." For his first public appearance following the Sixteenth Party Congress, Hu Jintao, the new general secretary of the CCP, chose the twentieth anniversary of the promulgation of the 1982 constitution, emphasizing how that document has promoted socialist democracy, law, and human rights.

Third, there was a tension over the basis for making party policy. As an exclusive political party based on a solipsistic claim to truth, the CCP traditionally did not admit (at least openly) considerations other than Marxist-Leninist doctrine to influence its decisionmaking. But in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, there was a clear recognition that there were "truths" in the world that were not encompassed by Marxism-Leninism as traditionally understood. There were "objective" economic "laws" that, if violated, would exact a cost on the party and the nation. Ambiguity was reintroduced through the argument that Marxism is a methodology, not a dogma, so Marxism could grow and develop as it came to understand these "objective" truths and thus incorporate them into Marxism-Leninism. However, the "Marxism as methodology" argument introduced two other tensions. First, "reformers" (those seeking to "develop" Marxism) parted ways from more orthodox upholders of the Marxist tradition, thus introducing tensions between "reformers" and "conservatives" into the party. Second, the Marxism as methodology argument no doubt slowed the absorption of Western economic understandings into China by suggesting that they could not be right until they were properly explained in Marxist-Leninist terms. Thus, it was not until Deng Xiaoping's 1992 trip to the south that arguments about markets and plans being characteristics of capitalist and socialist societies, respectively, were finally squelched, if in fact they were fully muted. One hears echoes of this debate in the argument about whether private entrepreneurs can become members of the CCP. One also wonders whether contemporary arguments about the standing of neoliberal economics and globalization are not, at least in part, echoes of these earlier arguments. In any event, the argument would be that, on the one hand, the admission that there were "objective truths" "out there" paved the way for incremental reform and institutionalization, while, on the other hand, the need to reinterpret such "truths" in Marxist- Leninist terms stretched this process out and even today inhibits institutionalization of the system.

Fourth, almost from the beginning of the Dengist period there was an effort to rejuvenate the body of party cadres. This was in part because the group of veteran cadres who returned to power following the Cultural Revolution really was aged (like Deng himself who was seventy-three in 1978) and lacked the physical vigor needed to rule. It was also because many in that veteran cadre cohort were considerably more conservative than Deng Xiaoping and did not share his vision of marketization and reform. And it was also because Deng wanted a younger and more professionally competent group of cadres to replace the veteran revolutionaries. In selecting younger cadres, educational criteria were given great weight in part because these were relatively apolitical criteria upon which people could agree. Technocrats had an advantage in this competition largely because their backgrounds were apolitical. People from different groups could agree on technocrats because they had no obvious political leanings.

Thus, generational succession became a part of reform and institutionalization. By the early 1990s, revolutionaries had been replaced by technocrats. Part of this process of generational succession was the gradual institutionalization of retirement norms. Retirement norms are universal features of bureaucratic systems, and the recruitment of younger, better educated, and more professionally competent people began to establish professional bureaucratic norms. Thus, there were the beginnings of a civil service reform, though those hopes were snuffed out, at least temporarily, by the reversal of Zhao Ziyang's reforms in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989.

Fifth, there was the changing relationship between the party and the economy. The story of China's economy "growing out of the plan" is too well-known to be repeated here; what needs to be emphasized is that, as the market orientation has taken hold, there has been an effort (by no means fully implemented) to develop secondary markets, standardize laws, implement accountancy regulations, and free enterprises from government control. As price competitiveness has increased, opportunities to collect rents have been reduced. In and of themselves, such trends would support and, to a certain extent demand, increased institutionalization.

Finally, there is globalization, in general, and the WTO, in particular. The degree to which globalization brings about institutionalization is hotly debated, but certainly many proponents of China's accession to the WTO believe that it is an important factor. Globalization, particularly the rules of the WTO, will force enormous changes in Chinese governance because the WTO demands transparency and an end to government subsidies in most instances. Most of all, because globalization enlarges the scope of competition, various areas in China will be forced to compete with each other (and with cities in other countries) to create the best investment environment. Those areas in which there is less government interference in business, less corruption, and more service provided to business will do better. Globalization also means a competition to recruit and retain the best people, precisely those who are most mobile. So those areas that make life more comfortable for skilled personnel will do better over the long run--and that generally means the government is becoming more responsive to the demands of the emerging middle class.

Although these and no doubt other factors facilitate and, to some extent, propel institutionalization, or reinstitutionalization, they do not appear to be enough, in and of themselves, to bring about legal-rational authority embedded in a market economy. In part, this is because these changes are partial. A partially reformed economic system in a dubious legal environment has spurred the money-power nexus described so well by He Qinglian in her Pitfalls of Modernization.

Mostly, however, the fact that the reinstitutionalization of the system is only partial stems from the continuing role of the party. The party inhibits and distorts the creation of institutions because the party remains more important than the state (so there cannot be real civil service reform), because the party remains more important than the law (so the constitution and other laws remain goals more than realities), and because the party, by granting power to its cadres, prevents the economy from becoming fully independent. Moreover, reforms have corroded traditional norms within the party without inhibiting the abuse of power. As the CCP comes more to resemble Tammany Hall and less the Leninist party of Mao, corruption becomes not so much a by-product of the operation of the party as essential to its functioning. And corruption is anathema to institutionalization.

Listing these dysfunctionalities makes the picture look bleaker than it is. The bureaucracy has clearly become better, as better educated and more professional cadres have been promoted to positions of responsibility. The economy, while cultivating the support of cadres (the cost of doing business), has managed to do quite well. Further, the legal system has begun to play a positive role, at least in some areas of the economy and society. And even the degeneration of the party has a bright side--the social protests that it unintentionally sets off have started the party on a course of reform that might reduce the worst abuses.

One element of party rule that is important to consider in its own right is that of political succession, and it is to that factor that this chapter now turns.