Chapter 1: Political Succession: Changing Guards and Changing Rules
Joseph Fewsmith

Political succession might be divided into two large topics, that of generational succession and that of political succession at the highest reaches of power. Generational change, of course, is a product of the decisions to rejuvenate the cadre force and to enforce retirement ages. Each generation brings a different experience based on its formative experiences and educational background. In the case of China, the major split was between the revolutionary generation (which included both Mao and Deng) and the postrevolutionary generation (headed by Jiang Zemin), though there are obviously differences with each generation. The revolutionary generation was distinguished, among other things, by an extraordinary self-confidence. Mao launched the country into the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, apparently without concern that he might unleash forces he could not control. Similarly, Deng was bold enough to launch dramatic economic reforms, without fearing that he could not deal with the consequences.

The generational experiences of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng were quite different from those of the revolutionary generation. Rather than engage in heroic action in the course of founding a new state, they and others of their generation had to climb the bureaucratic ladder, rung-by-rung. Their careers advanced because of their caution, not their boldness. It is not surprising that policy over the past decade, though not without its share of success, has been guided by a more cautious policy-making style (Zhu Rongji is a bit of an exception here!).

The generation of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is marked by somewhat different characteristics. First, this is the first generation to rise to the top rungs of political power without any personal memory of pre-1949 China. Second, these leaders have traveled very little outside of China; they were too young to study in the Soviet Union and too old to study in the West. Third, their careers were delayed by the Cultural Revolution (those, like Hu and Wen, who were graduated from college before the Cultural Revolution, basically stood to one side while that event coursed through the body politic; those who are younger members of this "fourth generation" were Red Guards and gained in political sophistication but also in ideological disillusionment). Fourth, their careers are associated with promoting economic reform, and they no doubt have drawn lessons from the traumatic events of 1989, though it may be some time until we are sure of precisely what those lessons were.

These generational characteristics can and do influence the exercise of political power, though how and to what extent are difficult to pin down. Leaders such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao--technocrats who had their careers delayed by the Cultural Revolution and then rose because of their administrative skills, are likely to be cautious about political reform, fearing that it may unleash forces that they are unable to control--but they are also likely to be rather openminded regarding policy options. They are, after all, technocrats and they seek solutions that "work." But both seem to be "systems builders"--people who are trying to systematize the system within the confines of the basic structures of the party and state (see below). Interestingly, although the top leadership of the CCP is now officially in the hands of technocrats such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, they are joined by others of their own generation who, while also technocrats, have nevertheless had substantially different experiences. Those born after 1948 (in other words eighteen-years-old at the start of the Cultural Revolution) are likely to have had substantial involvement in the Cultural Revolution. However, this political experience probably makes them, like the elder members of their own generation, abhor the ideological struggles and social chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Their organizational experience in "linking up" (chuan lian) to share their "revolutionary experiences" is apt to make them bolder and more self-confident, somewhat like the revolutionary generation (though by no means to that extent). This could bring about an interesting combination of caution and risk-taking.

Nevertheless, another characteristic of the new leadership is that their experience and contacts are limited. Although they have generally had wider career experience than the "third generation" of leaders, they, too, have had to climb the career ladder step-by-step, generally within a single xitong (system). This has limited their exposure to other xitong and the personal contacts that they would have developed if they had participated in the work of other bureaucracies. This limitation is particularly true with respect to the military. The new leadership has not served in the military, though some, such as Zeng Qinghong, appear to have widespread connections with the military by virtue of their education and elite family backgrounds.

Elite succession creates a dynamic that is related to generational succession but also distinct from it. The fundamental problem, of course, is that there is no legitimate way to transfer power from one leader to another. Mao, it seemed, had the authority to pass his power on, but his last-minute efforts to give authority to Hua Guofeng were overturned by the party and by Deng Xiaoping, who criticized such a personal bequest of power as a "feudal" practice. That criticism notwithstanding, it appears that Deng tried to pass on power not only to Jiang Zemin (who may not have been his first choice) but also to Hu Jintao, thus attempting to institutionalize a new pattern of leadership succession. The first point that should be made is that, although there have been clear attempts by political leaders to name their successors, the party has not been altogether comfortable with that practice and has increasingly tried to institutionalize political succession. The second point is that weak institutions and the continuation of traditional political culture have so far limited efforts to institutionalize leadership succession.

The effort to institutionalize political succession at the highest level grows out of the increasing institutionalization of political transfers at lower levels. Efforts to rejuvenate the cadre force in the 1980s led to the gradual acceptance of retirement ages for cadres at the ministerial level and below. Moreover, the membership of the Central Committee has been increasingly composed of the occupants of specific positions (i.e., all provincial party secretaries and governors are now named to the Central Committee, approximately percent of the seats are reserved for the military, and so forth). This, of course, does not mean that promotion to those positions cannot be manipulated by personal clientalism and other factors, but at least it seems to regularize and limit political competition to some extent.

However, efforts to institutionalize political procedures above the Central Committee level, particularly at the Politburo and Central Military Commission (CMC) level, have been notably less successful. The CMC, the source of ultimate power in the system, has been highly personalized. Even when Deng Xiaoping tried to spread political benefits around to different groups within the party, the CMC was nevertheless packed by veterans of the Second Field Army (in which Deng served as political commissar). When Jiang Zemin took over, he assiduously cultivated support within the military, handpicking those to be promoted to the highest level. Although observers of the military note that strong professional norms have gained ground in the military in recent years, the civilian party leadership still seems unable to ignore this important political resource.

Nevertheless, succession has increased efforts to define political rules at the highest level of the political system. For instance, when Jiang Zemin wanted to oust Qiao Shi from the leadership at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, he set the retirement age at seventy. Jiang himself, then seventy-one, was excused from following this rule because he was the "core" leader. One is no doubt correct to view such political maneuvers in a cynical light, but setting a rule, which may become institutionalized, is certainly better than exercising arbitrary power, or accusing one's political opponent of being a "capitalist roader" or of some other such political error.

What are the incentives for a political leader such as Jiang Zemin to endorse a general rule--retirement age--in order to oust a rival such as Qiao Shi rather than to simply remove him through the exercise of raw power? This has to do with both succession and the overall evolution of the political system. As a leader of the postrevolutionary generation, it would have been difficult for Jiang to claim the right to purge a political rival on the basis of ideology. This speaks not only to the fading of ideology over time but also to the inability of successor generations to embody the ideological legitimacy of the revolutionary generation. Then, too, there was the specific political atmosphere of the post-Tiananmen period. Ironically, the ideological excess of the immediate post-Tiananmen period created an atmosphere in which expression of ideology was less legitimate; the regime was able to rebuild legitimacy precisely because it moved away from the rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism. By the mid- 1990s, it would have been unacceptable for Jiang openly to criticize Qiao for committing a "political" error, so a nonpolitical "crime" (age) was chosen.

In other words, given that their own backgrounds limit their experience in different areas of party work and that the party structure of which they are now in charge has degenerated in terms of ideological conviction and organizational discipline, new leaders who come to power through succession must find different levers through which to exercise control. One possibility is to increase the role of personal connections (by promoting friends and protégés), a possibility that would increase the role of personal (as opposed to ideational) factionalism in the party. Another is to increase the role of institutions. Just as generational succession created incentives to institutionalize retirement norms and at least begin efforts to create a professional civil service, leaders such as Jiang have an incentive to establish rules in order to deal with political rivals. It appears that, indeed, there are incentives both to rely on personal factionalism and to create institutional norms, and one of the very real problems that the CCP faces today is the tension between these conflicting imperatives.

The example of Jiang's ouster of Qiao Shi (other examples could be cited) nevertheless suggests an instrumental use of rules and institutions, and the results of the Sixteenth Party Congress very much reflect the ongoing tension between the need to legitimize power through general rules and institutions and the realities that such norms are not strong enough (at least yet) to genuinely channel the conduct of politics.

The political dynamic over the year or two preceding the congress suggested that Jiang Zemin very much hoped to emulate Deng Xiaoping's model of formally retiring but exercising ultimate authority from "behind the screen." Thus, he trumpeted his theory of the "Three Represents" (which were enshrined in the party constitution at the Sixteenth Party Congress) and built something of a personality cult around himself. It was frequently argued that "Jiang Zemin is no Deng Xiaoping," meaning that his personal prestige was never on a par with that of his predecessor, but the results of the congress suggested that Jiang, in fact, was able to maintain considerable personal authority. First, he continued to head the party CMC (and was elected to head the state CMC at the National People's Congress [NPC] the following spring). Second, he expanded the size of the Politburo Standing Committee to accommodate two additional protégés, and third, the Politburo Standing Committee was packed with five or six of Jiang's closest associates (depending on who is doing the counting). Thus, even while Jiang presided over a congress that called for the "standardization, institutionalization, and the procedualization" (guifanhua, zhiduhua, chengxuhua) of the system, his desire to maintain his own authority--and perhaps the broader requirements of the political system--led him to engage in the politics of personalism.